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Peace in South Sudan:  
Don’t Repeat the Same Mistakes 
by Gerrit Kurtz
Germany should advocate in the UN Security Council for a course correction on the inter-
national approach to peace in South Sudan. If high-level mediation, addressing impunity, 
and grassroots reconciliation are not prioritized, international pressure to form a transi-
tional government by November 12, 2019, is likely to lead to renewed violence.
In Juba, South Sudan’s capital, it seems to be Groundhog 
Day, with the same events reoccurring in a never-ending 
loop. The current run-up to a November 12 deadline to 
form a transitional government closely resembles the 
predicament of just half a year ago, when the parties had 
extended the initial deadline from May.
Under intense regional and international pressure after 
the collapse of the original peace agreement of August 
2015, the government and opposition parties signed the 
Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict 
in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in September 2018. It included 
a ceasefire, which largely still holds across the country, at 
least among signatories. R-ARCSS also foresaw the cre-
ation of a transitional government of national unity, with 
positions for the various negotiating parties, including 
five vice-presidential posts.
A delegation of the UN Security Council, led by the 
United States and South Africa, visited Juba on October 
20, 2019. Its mission: impress upon all signatories to the R-
ARCSS the need to abide by their commitments, including 
forming the transitional government by the agreed dead-
line. The United States has already hinted at additional 
sanctions if the parties fail. Yet with no adequate security 
arrangements and political agreements in place, such 
international pressure risks repeating the same mistakes 
made at key junctures since the start of South Sudan’s 
civil war in December 2013.
The issues hindering the peace process and the forma-
tion of the transitional government of national unity are 
well-known. In a statement from early October 2019, the 
UN Security Council listed them itself: not only is there 
no agreement between the parties on the internal borders 
of South Sudan’s federal states and the cantonment and 
training of government and opposition security forces, 
but the government is also dragging its feet in releasing 
funds to support these processes.
Unsatisfied with the lack of progress, the most promi-
nent opposition group – the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army/Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) led by 
Riek Machar – announced in early October that it would 
not participate in the transition government. Machar 
maintained his objection during the Security Council’s 
mid-October visit. Similarly, the South Sudan Opposi-
tion Alliance, another signatory of the peace agreement, 
said that its participation hinged on the resolution of the 
outstanding issues. President Salva Kiir has maintained 
that he will form the transitional government even if 
some opposition groups choose not to participate. Mean-
while, there are already allegations that Kiir is training 
new forces.
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Déjà Vu of the Original Peace Agreement
The current peace deal risks sharing the fate of the 
original peace agreement of August 2015, which quickly 
collapsed three years ago amid the escalation of fighting, 
spread of violence, and fragmentation of the parties in-
volved. Then, international pressure brought Kiir, Machar, 
and a smaller opposition group together to sign this 
agreement, which included a ceasefire, a power-sharing 
arrangement, and a commitment to establish a hybrid 
court under the aegis of the African Union. As became 
clear in the following months, the parties never intended 
to follow through with many of these commitments. 
Worse, the regional and international guarantors of the 
agreement let them get away with it.
Barely two months after he signed the peace agree-
ment, President Kiir announced the reorganization of 
South Sudan’s federal states, increasing their number 
from 10 to 28. As the power-sharing arrangements were 
tied to the original number, his move was a clear violation 
of the peace agreement. Furthermore, the government 
failed to withdraw the bulk of its security forces from 
Juba to cantonment sites on its periphery. Machar and Kiir 
agreed on security arrangements that brought hundreds 
of opposition forces to Juba to guarantee the safety of 
Machar and his team, further militarizing the capital.
Under international pressure and in a weak military 
position, Machar went to Juba in April 2016 to form 
a unity government. The arrangement proved to be 
deeply dysfunctional. When Machar’s and Kiir’s forces 
clashed at an illegal checkpoint in the city in July of that 
year, heavy fighting broke out, during which hundreds 
of civilians and fighters were killed. Machar fled Juba 
accompanied by a contingent of his rebels, with govern-
ment security forces in close pursuit. The government 
later revealed that it had paid Paul Malong, then chief of 
military staff, five million US dollars directly from the 
central bank to pursue and kill Machar, then the coun-
try’s first vice president.
International and regional reactions to these events 
were underwhelming. Beyond verbal criticism, there 
were neither repercussions for Kiir’s reorganization of 
state borders, nor for the July 2016 crisis. In addition, 
international and regional partners implicitly accepted 
that Taban Deng Gai, who had represented the opposition 
during the peace negotiations, had replaced Machar as 
first vice president while Machar was on the run.
Waking Up from Groundhog Day
Around 380,000 people are estimated to have died 
because of South Sudan’s civil war. The South Sudanese 
need a different international engagement. Germany sup-
ported the negotiations that led to the revitalized peace 
agreement last year with expertise and additional staff 
for the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD), the regional organiza-
tion in the Horn of Africa. As a donor and a current non-
permanent member of the UN Security Council, Germany 
– along with its European partners – now has the chance 
to steer international policymaking on South Sudan in 
new, more effective directions.
First of all, in partnership with the AU and IGAD, the 
Security Council needs to push for continuous mediation 
between the parties. Security arrangements and the in-
ternal political order were already at the heart of the fail-
ure of the previous transitional government. Therefore, 
it is baffling that IGAD has not yet managed to appoint 
a permanent head of the peace agreement’s monitoring 
body. South Sudan should not just be seen as an issue to 
shape US Ambassador to the UN Kelly Craft’s public pro-
file; rather, it deserves sustained political attention from 
the region, as well as from international decision-makers, 
including in Europe. There is no shortcut around negotia-
tions between the parties. High-level mediators not only 
need to bring all the main players to the negotiating table 
until there is a consensus, but they also need to quickly 
follow-up with sanctions in the event of serious violations.
Secondly, donor countries like Germany need to spell 
out their conditions for support of the peace process more 
explicitly. Right now, the South Sudanese parties shape 
the narrative by calling for international donors to release 
further funds for the implementation of the peace agree-
ment, in particular the retraining of government and op-
position forces. Instead, donors should insist on the South 
Sudanese government’s pledge to release 100 million US 
dollars for this process. While the government currently 
spends millions on a presidential jet and foreign medical 
treatment for MPs, it is neither paying security services 
nor providing sufficient food and water at cantonment 
sites. Any support of the peace process by external donors 
should be bound to financial audits and transparency of 
South Sudan’s oil sector.
Thirdly, peacemaking in South Sudan needs to move 
away from a purely transactional model of power-sharing, 
in which government positions are meted out to the par-
ties according to their negotiating strength. As Lotje de 
Vries and Mareike Schomerus argued in 2017, a peace deal 
alone will not end the war in South Sudan. Europe needs 
to follow the US example by going after the cash flows 
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funding the violence more aggressively than in the past. 
Thanks to investigations by the Sentry, a US civil society 
organization; the panel of experts appointed by the UN 
Security Council; and the UN Human Rights Commission 
on South Sudan, detailed evidence already exists of the 
patronage networks benefiting from the civil war. The 
EU should freeze the assets of more corrupt members of 
the South Sudanese elite. Addressing impunity by getting 
the proposed hybrid court on South Sudan up and run-
ning under the aegis of the African Union also deserves a 
higher priority.
International pressure on the parties needs to focus on 
resolving the outstanding issues, not on forming a bloated 
transitional government with minimal trust. Machar can 
be forgiven for not trusting the UN’s assurance of his and 
his team’s safety if they return to Juba. In July 2016, UN 
troops were bogged down amid the urban fighting in 
the city and did not even intervene to halt an assault on 
humanitarian and UN workers at a nearby compound, let 
alone protect civilians in the vicinity of its camps. While 
the UN Mission has been bumped up to include additional 
forces with a robust mandate and improved procedures, it 
is unclear whether these forces would be able to engage 
with the thousands of government troops stationed in 
Juba if the 2016 scenario were to repeat itself.
For the moment, sustaining the ceasefire needs to have 
priority. It has enabled the conclusion of more than 130 
local reconciliation efforts in South Sudan’s myriad inter- 
and intra-communal conflicts. The UN Mission in South 
Sudan, as well as the South Sudanese Council of Church-
es, has supported many of these efforts. Both deserve the 
Security Council’s full political support. Over time, local 
peace agreements can help build national peace and 
development from the ground up – until, one day, South 
Sudan can break the loop of renewed violence for good.
Dr. Gerrit Kurtz is a research fellow with the German 
Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), working on conflict 
prevention and stabilization in Africa.
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